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The Functions of Hong Kong’s Chinese History, from colonialism to 
decolonization 
 
 
This paper examines the nature and socio-political functions of Hong Kong’s Chinese 
History during colonialism and since decolonization, and argues that these functions 
have resulted in a curriculum that is characterised by rote learning and geared towards 
social control.  Students are initiated into the traditional, orthodox view of Chinese 
history and prescribed moral judgements.  As a consequence, there is little chance for 
independent thinking on the part of students. 
 
 
Keywords: Chinese History, orthodox, academic rationalism, Han-centred, moralising, 
social control 
 
Introduction 
History teaching in Hong Kong is unique among school subjects in the passions it 
arouses – public and private, political and bureaucratic, emotional, intellectual and 
physical – as interest groups struggle to control curriculum development.  The 
purpose and ownership of history remain contentious due to the distinctive nature of 
Hong Kong as a post-colonial society.  The region has inherited from the colonial era 
an unusual approach to the teaching of history, whereby Chinese History has become 
separate from the subject, History, informed by its own philosophy and pedagogical 
assumptions, and viewed as a discipline with concerns entirely separate from ‘World’ 
History, and indeed from the history of Hong Kong itself.  Previous research has 
examined the historical origins of the split between History and Chinese History in the 
local school curriculum, and the influence of the politics of Hong Kong’s transition on 
curriculum development in this sensitive area (Vickers, 2005; Vickers, Kan & Morris, 
2003; Kan and Vickers 2002). This article develops and extends this research, 
focusing particularly on the philosophical rationale underpinning the Chinese History 
curriculum.  
Officially, the function of Chinese History is to transmit the traditional 
orthodox view of history, to act as a moralising agent, and to help promote feelings of 
national identity among young people, as encapsulated by the former Chief Executive, 
Tung Chee Hwa, in his first policy address:  
 
We will incorporate the teaching of Chinese values in the school curriculum 
and provide more opportunities for students to learn about Chinese History 
and culture. This will foster a stronger sense of Chinese identity in our 
students (Policy Address, 8 October 1997). 
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Chinese History can perhaps be seen as the prime curricular vehicle for educating (or 
re-educating) Hong Kong students as patriotic Chinese citizens, amidst perceptions 
among the Beijing leadership and their local supporters that Hong Kong people lost 
their sense of national identity under British rule, and to compensate for this need a 
substantial measure of ‘national education’.  
At the same time, however, an alternative view persists amongst sections of 
the local educational and political elite that is opposed to such a nationalistic drive. 
For example, as previous research has demonstrated, those responsible for developing 
the curriculum for the subject of History have been attracted by the fashion, 
particularly prevalent in the UK, parts of the USA, and other parts of the English 
speaking world since the 1970s, for using history education to teach the skill of 
critical thinking, through encouraging students to work with primary sources, and 
initiating them into some of the techniques used by professional historians (Kan & 
Vickers, 2002). The thinking behind this approach is reflected in the current UK 
Social Studies Curriculum (2005), which demands that its ‘Advanced’ level history 
students ‘analyse and explain different historical interpretations and [begin] to 
evaluate them.’  Across the USA, a number of Social Studies Curricula, such as that 
of the state of Arizona (2005), require Grade 12 students to analyse historical and 
current events as historians, using primary and secondary sources to evaluate the 
legitimacy of the commentaries of particular historical events and draw conclusions.  
The Australian Capital Territory, Board of Senior Secondary Students History 
Framework (2004) says that History students should ‘critically assess sources of 
information about the past, and statements made about it, and come to realise that 
knowledge is problematic’.  
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It is important to note that such statements of intent do not necessarily reflect 
classroom reality, and that there are potentially serious problems inherent in an 
approach that goes so far in stressing the cultivation of generic skills over the 
accumulation of historical knowledge (see, for example, Cave, 2005).  However, it is 
broadly accurate to say that for almost half a century in the West, despite differences 
on various issues, especially postmodernism, history educators have followed 
historians such as G.R. Elton in insisting that history as taught in schools should 
initiate children into the skills of the professional historian – in other words, the skills 
of research, analysis, reasoning and the weighing of evidence to reach an independent 
conclusion.  This is in sharp contrast to the idea of history championed by those 
associated with the Chinese History subject in Hong Kong.  With this dichotomy of 
approaches in mind, this article investigates the origins and nature of the orthodoxy 
and moralising aspects of the Chinese History curriculum and their impact on 
teaching, learning and examination during the colonial period and in the subsequent 
post colonial era. 
Origins of Chinese History  
Chinese History has frequently been criticised as a boring and conservative subject in 
the Hong Kong curriculum, performing moralising and conservative functions in the 
service of the state and requiring students to memorise established views rather than 
encouraging them to use rational arguments to interpret history. However, it is 
important to note that these characteristics did not originate in Hong Kong during the 
colonial era, but were inherited from traditional Chinese historiography. The reason 
for this is that, according to Kan (2007), in the 1950s, the key Chinese History 
curriculum developers were Chinese History specialists who had fled from China and 
had brought with them the traditional Chinese historiography which they incorporated 
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into the Chinese History curriculum. Therefore, in order to understand fully the 
development of the curriculum and the ways in which its functions have been 
manipulated by the ruling authority during the colonial era and after the handover of 
sovereignty, it is necessary to trace the origins of Chinese historiography.  
 
The traditional purposes of writing history, according to the Spring and 
Autumn Annals (Chunqiu, attributed to Confucius, c.551-479 B.C.), were essentially 
to highlight moral behaviour, differentiate the Han from the ‘barbarians’ and to 
establish hierarchies.  For more than two thousand years from the Han dynasty (206 
B.C.) to the end of the Qing dynasty (A.D.1911), Confucianism was the official 
philosophy of imperial China.   
Contemporary Chinese politicians of an authoritarian inclination tend to 
appeal to a stereotyped, homogenized and anachronistic version of Confucianism 
known as ‘Chinese values’.  Tu Weiming (1999) specifies the relationship between 
political legitimacy and Confucian studies by referring to the interpretation of 
Confucian thoughts by political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew, Jiang Zhongzheng 
and Jiang Zemin.  In ancient China, narratives of Dynastic Histories numbered 24 by 
the time the Qing dynasty collapsed, constituted the orthodox account of the Chinese 
past (The 24 Dynastic Histories were histories of the imperial dynasties, or more 
precisely, histories of the imperial families).  History in the hands of imperial court 
officials primarily served the function of legitimising each new dynasty by 
emphasising the failings (and especially the moral failings) of its predecessor.  Its 
moralising role also made history a resource with which to exhort or admonish rulers 
or ministers who appeared to be straying from the ‘correct’ path.  
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There were two types of orthodox historians who, although tending to share a 
similar state-centred vision of the nature of history and its moralising purposes, 
differed primarily in their apportioning of moral praise and blame.  One group were 
those individual literati, such as Sima Qian, for whom writing history was a private 
business, while the second were the official historians who worked in the Guoshi 
guan, (Historiography Institute, A.D. 618 to 1911) where history writing was 
conceived as a national enterprise and a collective work.  The 24 Dynastic Histories 
were mostly written by official historians.  In addition, history was written to serve 
the interests of the state (for example, loyalty was defined in terms of adherence to the 
current regime), and the narrative focused overwhelmingly on the doings of the 
political elite, the imperial court, and various notable individuals.  Chinese History’s 
orthodox characteristics subsequently had a significant impact on historians. 
Despite much criticism of Confucian thought during the early Republican 
period (from 1911 to the mid-1920s), particularly following the May 4th Movement 
(from 1919), by the time of the Japanese invasion in the 1930s, history in general and 
the Confucian classics in particular were regarded as an important means of 
stimulating patriotic sentiments.  Influential historians such as Qian Mu saw history, 
and especially Confucian studies, as a source of national revitalization.  Following the 
Chinese Civil War, Qian fled to Hong Kong in 1949, setting up New Asia College in 
1950, and in 1963 this became one of the colleges of the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong.  His book The General History of China (Guo Shi Da Gang) remains one of the 
most popular references for Chinese History students in Hong Kong and Taiwan.  
Some of Qian’s students, including Sun Kwok-tung and Wong Fuk-luen, taught 
Chinese History in the Chinese University of Hong Kong and were authors of some of 
the earliest local Chinese History textbooks.  
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Confucianism and imperial politics in China thus led to a strongly-ingrained 
view of history as a practice, whereby ‘correct’ views on individual events and 
personages were dictated by the state, and the function of history was geared towards 
providing moral exemplars to guide the behaviour of individuals (see Alisa Jones, 
2005).   
In Hong Kong itself, these principles were major influences on the 
development of the curriculum for Chinese History, both at school and university 
level.  The highly conservative, traditionalist emphasis on the ancient dynastic past on 
the part of exiled scholars who had taken refuge in Hong Kong after the Communists 
established their regime in 1949, such as those at New Asia College, coincided neatly 
with the desire of the colonial government to render the teaching of Chinese History 
depoliticised and decontextualised.  Thus emerged a local subject community of 
teachers and scholars of Chinese history which was willing to cooperate with the 
government in developing a local curriculum.  At the same time, the presence of the 
Communist regime across the border prompted key players in curriculum 
development to exercise a form of self-regulation in order to avoid upsetting the 
Chinese government.  Chinese History was thus a subject that encouraged students to 
identify culturally with China, but distanced them from modern Chinese politics.  
This study ranges from 1945 to 2008, and for the purpose of conceptualisation, 
has been divided into three phases that relate to changes in the broader socio-political 
context and changes in education and curriculum policy.  Throughout the three phases, 
three dominant themes have typified the official curriculum and the teaching, learning 
and examining of the subject: the study of Chinese History as a continuous whole, an 
orthodox historical viewpoint, and a Han-centred viewpoint.  Concerning the first 
theme, it was thought necessary for Chinese History to be studied as a continuous 
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whole in order for students to appreciate China’s greatness and hence establish 
students’ affiliation with China.  Thus, the curriculum covered more than 3000 years 
of history (~2100 BC / ~1600 BC to 1911, 1945, or 1976), with heavy emphasis on 
the earlier periods (particularly in the first and second phases), for example, the Han, 
Tang and Ming, which were regarded as the golden periods of Chinese history.  With 
regard to an orthodox historical viewpoint, accounts of historical events and 
personages, together with concomitant value judgements, were set out in accordance 
with The 24 Dynastic Histories, and students were expected to follow the stipulated 
orthodox views.  The Han-centred viewpoint was evident in the way in which 
emphasis was given to the superiority of the Han over other races. 
1945-74 
In this initial period after World War II, the government began a massive expansion of 
education.  At the same time, mindful of the political conflict on the mainland, and its 
own vulnerable status as colonial ruler of Hong Kong, the colonial government was 
determined to exercise strict control over all aspects of education and to pursue an 
apolitical school curriculum.  In the 1940s, schools adopted the Nationalist 
Government’s Chinese History curriculum until The Report of the Chinese Studies 
Committee in 1953, which recommended that Hong Kong should devise its own 
curriculum emphasising social and cultural history, rather than political history.  The 
Committee also advised that this curriculum should aim at reinforcing Chinese moral 
and social values:  
To the modern Chinese, the problem [the collapse of traditional beliefs] is 
even more realistic, for many of them have lost respect for most of the long-
established Chinese virtues, but have not been able to assimilate the best of 
the Western virtues. This is indeed a vital need: to have all the sound and 
healthy elements in the fabric of the Chinese social life and culture to be 
revived. …The study of History has a high moral and social value, for it can 
not only provide standards of reference by which to criticise our own age, but 
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also give one the ability to get outside oneself.’ (p. 21) (Italics added to show 
the Committee’s perception of the value of Chinese History)  
 
Although the moralising function of Chinese History, which was emphasised 
in the Report of Chinese Studies and in line with The 24 Dynastic Histories, was not 
explicitly expressed in the examination curriculum, nor realised at the level of 
teaching and learning, and examinations, it provided the background for its inclusion 
in the later phases. (A more detailed analysis of these three aspects is made in the 
second phase [1974-97] and the third phase [1997-2008] as during these periods 
teaching syllabuses were issued in which official views on Chinese History were 
clearly presented.)  It was also during this first phase that the notion of ‘the study of 
Chinese History as a continuous whole’ began to take root.  At all levels (junior 
secondary, Certificate Education Examination (CEE, Grade 11) and Higher-
level/Advanced-level), the Chinese History curriculum was characterized by the 
adoption of the orthodox views enshrined in The 24 Dynastic Histories, and a Han-
centred viewpoint, both of which focused primarily on imperial court history, with 
cultural, social or economic history accorded a distinctly minor role.  Teachers rarely 
challenged accepted views contained in textbooks: 
Rarely did teachers challenge views presented in the textbook. Teachers 
tended to use only one textbook to teach and assume that it could solve all the 
problems in history learning. (Wu, 1973, p.172).  
 
 
Publishers followed the examination syllabuses closely to ensure that their 
textbooks would successfully pass the official review, their safest option being to 
adopt a conservative approach.  The traditional orthodox views and the Han-centred 
viewpoint were reflected in the syllabus topics, textbook narratives, examination 
questions and the marking schemes.  Typical of many examples from H-level and A-
level examinations are questions such as: ‘Examine the achievements made by the 
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Han race in the anti-Manchurian struggles in the Qing dynasty’. (H-level examination 
question, 1952).  Students were simply expected to reproduce ‘model answers’ in the 
examinations, and it was not at all surprising that students regarded Chinese History 
as an unpopular subject.  
1974-97 
During the second phase, in the absence of contrary views in the subject committee, 
the subject community was able to secure the inherited nature and role of Chinese 
History in the school curriculum.  A strong culture was established around the subject, 
helping to shield it from the broader curriculum reforms that took place in the 1990s 
(Kan, Vickers and Morris, 2007).  The minimal changes that were made can be 
attributed more to the personal preferences of subject officers and committee 
members and of the local subject community, than to any official influences from the 
‘colonial’ authorities (see Vickers, Kan and Morris, 2003).  Those who exerted the 
most influence during this period were, as in the previous phase, government officials.  
D. L. Luk, an education officer, managed to acquire a virtually free hand in deciding 
on issues regarding the Chinese History curriculum.  Luk’s views on the nature and 
role of the subject to a large extent coincided with the pre-existing characteristics of 
the Chinese History curriculum between 1974-97: an emphasis on transmitting a 
highly conservative vision of morality and Chinese culture, limited scope for criticism 
of received verdicts on historical events or figures, the need for Chinese history to be 
studied in its entirety, a stress on memorisation:  
Section A (dynastic history) was more important. Each dynasty has its own 
characteristics. We stressed that all these characteristics had to be brought up 
in our teaching so that we could see the greatness of Chinese History… To 
promote moral education and civic education through teaching Chinese 
History was something required by the then Director of Education, M.K. 
Leung.  At that time all subjects received the same instruction. My senior, P.S. 
Chan (History senior inspector) asked me to do this [draft on how to 
incorporate civic and moral education in Chinese History teaching]. Hence I 
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used one hour to complete a one-page table which incorporated moral values 
into specific events and personages ... (Italics added, personal communication, 
4 August 1999) 
 
According to Luk, moral values could be taught through the study of imperial 
court history.  Thus, the 1982 teaching syllabus, which Luk had a key hand in drafting, 
most noticeably continued to emphasise the development of good behavior in students 
through studying Chinese History, and a new aim to this effect was stated in this 
syllabus (although it was already implicitly included in the curriculum in the first 
phase): ‘to develop students’ good behaviour through studying the deeds of historical 
personages’ (Chinese History syllabus, 1982, p.6).  The following are examples of the 
orthodox views concerning the deeds of personages in the 1982 teaching syllabus:   
After the unification of China, Qin Shihuang oppressed his people and levied 
heavy taxes on them. That was why the Qin dynasty only lasted for 15 years. 
(p.19)  
 
Emperor Wu Di’s rule – was the most glorious period of the Han dynasty. 
Teachers should explain how he extended Chinese territory [his military 
action was described as ‘extended’ rather than ‘invaded’] and undertook many 
construction projects. In terms of military and cultural achievements he 
contributed to a prosperous period in the Han dynasty. (p.16)  
 
The above official prescriptions were established views concerning both the reasons 
for the rise and fall of individual dynasties and the good or bad behavior of 
individuals.  To illustrate these orthodox views further, the Curriculum Development 
Institute (CDI) issued a curriculum circular in 1993, which emphasized ‘the historical 
lessons to be learnt from the disasters caused by the factional conflict in the later Han 
period: this was a conflict between right and wrong, one that represented the state’s 
interests (state university students and courtiers) versus private interests (eunuchs)’ 
(Curriculum circular, No. 21, 1993, p. 12).  The official guide uniformly stated which 
party was right and which was wrong, but seldom required teachers or students to 
10 
supply arguments to support such claims, or to look for counter-arguments based on 
evidence.  It is therefore doubtful whether high-sounding aims such as ‘to cultivate 
students’ objectivity and analytical powers’, which also appeared in the official 
curriculum, were really valued highly by curriculum developers.  
A new aim appeared in the 1990 syllabus (Grade 10-11), ‘to nurture students’ 
good behaviour’, which encouraged emulation or condemnation of those about whom 
traditional moral judgements had been made in the syllabus or textbooks, judgements 
such as: ‘Qin [Shihuang] created a tyrannical government, people were extremely 
discontented and this led to the downfall of the dynasty (bad)’; and ‘Han Wu Di 
rewarded academic achievements and expanded the territory; he was to be applauded 
(good)’(p.11).  
The views expressed by key decision makers concerning the moralizing 
function of Chinese History show the thinking behind this aspect of the curriculum:  
The value of Chinese History lies in its moral values.  Let students learn the 
moral values.  I believe men make history, and history repeats itself.  There is 
a direction in history.  Nothing changes except the names of people and places.  
That is why politicians must learn history. (D. L. Luk, personal 
communication, 4 August 1999)  
 
History was thus seen largely as a gallery of moral exemplars, and analysis 
and argumentation based on evidence were not a major concern.   
With regard to Chinese culture, as in the Grade 10-11 syllabuses in the first 
phase (1945- 74), the first and principal aim of the 1990 syllabus was ‘to understand 
traditional Chinese culture’ (p.6) to establish a cultural rather than a political sense of 
Chinese identity.  However, although officials saw the study of Chinese culture as 
important for the stimulation of student interest, and for the aim of fostering pride in 
Chinese culture, it should be noted that the account of the ‘glory’ of Chinese culture 
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continued to be very much Han-centred, focusing on the culture of China’s majority 
Han.  Meanwhile, the cultures of the two non-Han ruling races, the Mongols and the 
Manchus, were portrayed in a negative light: in fact, both their culture and their ruling 
policies were denigrated.  In the case of the Mongols, this is illustrated by the 
following extracts from the syllabuses:  
They [Mongols] were nomads when they set up their regime in China. They 
were good at battles, poor in organization. Therefore, during the Yuan reign, 
there was continual confusion and chaos in politics and customs. Teachers can 
discuss with students ‘what was the impact of the low social status given to 
the Confucian scholars’ ...Teachers can discuss with students the fact that in 
the Yuan dynasty, the emperors did not have any ideals in administering the 
country. Their ruling policy was segregation, suppression, and deprivation. 
Hence Yuan rule was bound to fail. (Chinese History syllabus, 1990, p.31) 
 
Similar disparaging and dismissive views were expressed regarding the other non-Han 
dynasty, the Qing dynasty, with respect to their culture and their rule:  
Students do not have much interest in the cultural systems of the Manchus.  
Hence a brief narration would suffice.  There is no need to emphasize the 
evolution of culture during the Qing dynasty. (Chinese History syllabus, 1975, 
p.38)  
 
The study of Chinese History as a continuous whole that had been a major 
feature of the syllabuses of the first phase (1945-1974) retained its prominence in the 
1975 and 1982 syllabuses.  It was thought that students needed to study the whole of 
Chinese dynastic history in order to understand the meaning of ‘continuity’ and 
‘evolution’ in Chinese History.  Consequently, there was an enormous amount of 
material to be studied and there was actually little room or time for students, through 
analysis, to develop arguments and arrive at their own conclusions.  
During this second phase (1974-97), changes made to the official Chinese 
History curriculum were minimal, and individual rote learning, rather than 
collaborative group work and critical thinking, was promoted. 
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The overwhelming emphasis that the curriculum gave to dynastic history was 
reflected in Chinese History textbooks during this time.  An analysis of textbooks by 
Pong Long-wah (1987) identified the following characteristics of their content:  
One-fifth concerned palace intrigues, one-quarter to one-third dealt with 
warfare, one-tenth was about rebellions and uprisings, 7-8% concerned literary 
achievements, and 5% artistic or cultural activities.  Regarding the historical 
figures depicted as playing dominant roles, one-quarter were emperors, one-
third scholar-officials, one-eighth soldiers, and the others were eunuchs, 
women, monks, merchants, and artisans. (p. 113)   
 
Pong’s analysis reveals two aspects of the Chinese History curriculum: first, 
the content of dynastic history was irrelevant to the interests of students; second, in 
the official syllabus ‘dynastic history’ was synonymous with ‘political history’, but in 
reality Chinese History’s ‘political history’ (or dynastic history) took a very 
distinctive form and was not ‘political history’ in its western sense.  It had more to do 
with the events and personages of the imperial court, and these characteristics of 
dynastic history were regarded as ‘the basic facts of the rise and fall of dynasties’ 
(Chinese History syllabus, 1990, p.6), the learning of which was stipulated as one of 
the aims of Chinese History teaching in the official syllabus.  This implies that 
curriculum developers attributed the rise and fall of dynasties to key persons (and 
their moral virtues, or lack of them), while macro and structural perspectives had no 
part to play in analysis and explanation.   
Teachers and newspapers meanwhile increasingly criticised the syllabus for 
the sheer volume of its content, its emphasis on memorisation, and its continued 
avoidance of contemporary history:  As reported in Ming Pao and South China 
Morning Post respectively:  
We have conducted interviews with teachers concerning the new Grade 10-11 
Chinese History syllabus. They generally consider the syllabus too long and 
fragmented.  There is a big jump from one event to another.  Students have no 
option but to learn by rote (Ming Pao, 5 November 1994). 
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 Students are not hearing about post-1949 events because there are no 
questions dealing with the period in HK examination papers (before 1995 only 
pre-1945 questions were asked in the CEE). A study conducted by Julian 
Leung revealed that most secondary school teachers do not go past World War 
II in their teaching of Chinese History (South China Morning Post, .10 June 
1990)  
 
This observation was confirmed by CEE reports (for example, reports from 1980 to 
1997) which revealed that students did not pay much attention to history from 1911 to 
1976, as was shown in the relatively few attempts to answer these questions.  
Textbooks also reflected the traditional, orthodox view of Chinese History set 
out in the syllabuses during this time as this would be a prerequisite for textbooks to 
be included in the recommended list (revealed by Y.H. Cheng, Economic Journal 
Newspaper, 31 July 1982).  As a consequence of many teachers’ over-dependence on 
uncritical and inadequate textbooks, much of the teaching of Chinese History, far 
from encouraging original thought, was concerned with getting students to learn the 
traditional, established ‘facts’ of history.  As an article in the Young Post (13 May 
1986) complained ‘only facts are taught, and no analysis or evaluation of these facts’.  
Cultural history was not very popular with either teachers or students.  Many 
teachers found it difficult to teach and, being more familiar with dynastic history, 
tended to concentrate on that.  The following comment gives some indication of the 
difficulty and boredom associated with teaching and learning of cultural history:  
I taught Chinese History from the 1940s. During this time the curriculum was 
difficult and boring. The 1975 syllabus (Grade 7-9) included cultural history 
as Section B. However, topics in Section B were more suitable for sixth-form 
or university students, for example, the history of intellectual thought, foreign 
relations, and technology. Junior form students were not able to handle all 
these. (Permitted teacher, Ming Pao, 27 July 1988)  
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As already mentioned, examination questions and marking schemes reflected a 
Han-centred view of Chinese History, assuming the superiority of the Han race and 
denigrating the two non-Han races.  For example, one question which often came up 
in the CEE about the Yuan dynasty concerned the relationship between the downfall 
of the Yuan dynasty and its poor ruling policies.  From 1970 to 2000, there were 11 
years in which questions were set on the Yuan dynasty’s downfall and its ruling 
policies.  In another instance of Han-centredness, the question and marking scheme 
below show how the examiners differentiated the Han culture from that of the Qing, 
treating the Manchus in a very negative fashion: 
The power of the Qing was grounded in the policies of conciliation and 
oppression adopted in the earlier period. (1) What were the intentions of the 
policies of conciliation and oppression? (2) Give three examples to illustrate 
the two policies.  
 
(1) Conciliation policy – make use of the Han people to rule over Han 
[territory]. 
(2) Oppression policy  
- being aliens, Manchus’ culture and economy were backward. Hence 
they needed to use force to maintain their rule. 
- since anti-Manchu activities were increasing, the policy was to 
consolidate the dynasty’s rule. 
(3) Examples of conciliation – 8 were listed 
(4) Examples of oppression – 7 were listed  (CEE 1987) 
 
Thus, examination questions, marking schemes and textbook narratives 
identified two characteristics of Qing rule: first, the Hans were highly civilized, while 
the Manchus were aliens, backward and uncivilized; second, the reason why the 
Manchus were able to rule for 260 years was because of their policies of conciliation 
and oppression in ruling the Han people.  These Han-centred conclusions were in line 
with the curriculum, which judged the Mongols and Manchus in the same disparaging 
way.  
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In this period, the Chinese History curriculum was controlled by the 
government bureaucrats.  In terms of curriculum development, it was very much an 
inheritance from the first period (see, for example, Kan, Vickers and Morris 2007), 
with very few major changes made in the three dominant themes.  Although the junior 
and senior curriculum were respectively extended to 1976, which meant in principle 
that students had to study more than 3000 years of history, teachers and students alike 
tried to avoid modern history in teaching, learning and examinations.  Also, orthodox 
views were presented that aimed at indoctrinating students into an uncritical 
acceptance of the behavior of certain historical personages.  In addition, a Han-
centred viewpoint which differentiated the Han race from the non-Han race was also 
embedded in the official curriculum guide, teaching and learning, and examinations.  
1997-2008 
 Since the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the government’s promotion of 
national identity and patriotic education has been intensive.  However, the means by 
which these are disseminated is not restricted to the official curriculum; there are 
other channels through which students are constantly exposed to such propaganda.  
For example, the government has stipulated that the Chinese national anthem be 
played every day before the evening news on television; the majority of schools 
practise national flag raising on important occasions (leftist schools perform national 
flag raising every day); funding is offered by numerous organizations for students’ 
study tours in China; and deliberate efforts are made by the government to promulgate 
the achievements of China, amongst which economic growth, the space mission and 
later on, the Olympic games were key items of propaganda.  All this has been geared 
towards fostering in students, and people in general, a sense of affinity with China and 
hence, towards establishing their national identity.  Against this background, the 1982 
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junior level syllabus was revised and introduced in 1997. The revisions were 
principally aimed at meeting the political needs of the Hong Kong government, in 
particular, the building of a sense of national identification and the implementation of 
the principle of ‘One country, two systems’.  Similar revisions were made in the CEE 
syllabus (for Grade 11-12 students) in 2003, in which it was clearly stated that history 
education, as an important component of national education, should be regarded as a 
vehicle to strengthen students’ recognition of the country and its people.  For example, 
for political reasons, the new aim of promoting patriotism was most explicitly stated 
in both the junior level and CEE syllabuses:  
… to cultivate in students a sense of national identification and a sense of 
belonging to China and its people.   
 
Although no reference was made to the ideology of the Communist regime on the 
mainland, it was apparent that the key curriculum developers intended to politicise 
and contextualise the Chinese History curriculum after the handover because they saw 
an opportunity to strengthen Chinese History’s position within the school curriculum. 
However, Chinese History continued to be based on dynastic-political history, 
requiring students to study the whole of Chinese history, which covered more than 
3000 years.  For the junior level syllabus (1997), in order to reinforce the pre-
eminence of traditional culture, 21 learning objectives with corresponding 
illustrations of events and personages were listed in Section B (cultural history).  
Students were thus still expected to accept unquestioningly the greatness of 
traditional Chinese culture, which was assumed to equate to the culture of the ‘Han’ 
majority.   
One novelty in the junior level syllabus (1997) was its stipulated emphasis on 
the role of Chinese History as a vehicle for moral and civic education – and, in 
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particular, for patriotic education.  For example, one objective stipulated ‘to cultivate 
good conduct through knowing historical personages and events’ (p.7).  Also, for the 
first time, specific objectives of moral and civic education were set and illustrations 
were given of the good or bad behavior of certain historical figures with the aim of 
transmitting the orthodox views concerning correct or incorrect values for students to 
emulate or condemn.  For example, to illustrate the learning objective of ‘cultivating 
patriotic ideas, and not harming the nation’s interests for the sake of personal 
benefits’, the syllabus used an example in Chinese History ‘Shi Jingtang ceded 
sixteen districts located in the northern sections of modern Hebei and Shanxi 
provinces’ (Chinese History syllabus, 1997, Grade 7-9, p.22) (Shi Jingtang was a 
non-Han person, and at that time there were territorial conflicts between the Han and 
the non-Han people).  The objective implied that the ‘nation’ referred to the Han and 
hence even the non-Han people should consider the interests of the Han as their top 
priority.  In addition, certain topics were specified, together with advice on the 
teaching points and appropriate teaching and learning activities, and teachers were 
advised to refer to the prescribed manual even if they attempted to tailor the 
curriculum to suit the needs of the school.    
In contrast, the CEE syllabus (2003) was less prescriptive and advice was 
given to teachers to help promote students’ critical thinking.  For instance, one of its 
stated objectives for students was: ‘through knowing and critically examining the 
historical events and personages, cultivate good conduct’ (p. 3) (in stark contrast with 
the junior level stipulated aim: to cultivate good conduct through knowing historical 
personages and events).  In addition, less established views were presented regarding 
important historical figures and it was suggested that students should examine 
historical figures from different perspectives.  This change can be attributed to the 
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fact that in the face of curriculum reform and the emphasis on ‘Learning to learn’ 
(Education and Manpower Bureau 2001), curriculum developers could no longer 
confine themselves to the prescriptive orthodox views, but instead, had to follow the 
broader curriculum emphasis and gear the curriculum towards promoting students’ 
thinking skills.  This does signify an important breakthrough in the development of 
the Chinese History curriculum in the third phase.  However, it should be noted that 
the official intention may not be realised in the actual teaching and learning. 
Just as in the first and second phases of the subject’s development, textbook 
accounts of the two non-Han administered dynasties continue to be based on orthodox 
Han-centred historical views of Chinese history, which portray the Mongols and the 
Manchus as inferior to the Han in terms of both administrative ability and culture, and 
as oppressive rulers of China.  An examination of the junior level internal 
examination papers of a sample of ten schools revealed that whenever there were 
questions asked on the Yuan dynasty and Qing dynasty, they would in one way or 
another be related to the administrative measures adopted against the Han people.  In 
one of these schools, there was an examination paper that differentiated the Mongols 
from the Chinese – ‘In the Yuan dynasty, the Mongols adopted oppressive policies 
against the Chinese.  Give an account of the way in which the Han people and the 
Southerners (people living in the southern part of China) were treated differently in 
political affairs and legal matters’.   
As well as adopting a Han-centered approach to history, most textbooks 
follow the orthodox views, which have also always been characteristic of the Chinese 
History curriculum.  Concerning the new aim of ‘national identification’, many 
textbook narratives closely follow the views presented in the official curriculum.  In 
particular, since the handover, the Chinese Communist Party has been portrayed more 
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favorably.  For example, in editions since 1997 the phrases ‘allied with the Russians, 
allied with the Chinese Communist Party’ have been used, compared with ‘allied with 
the Russians, accommodated the Chinese Communist Party’ (The term ‘allied’ gives a 
higher status to the Communists than ‘accommodated’) in the earlier editions.  
While the promotion of ‘national feeling’ is evident in textbooks, politically 
sensitive issues, such as the 1989 June Fourth Incident, have been dealt with in a 
cautious manner by authors and publishers in order to avoid provoking the Beijing 
government.  Among the four most popular Chinese History textbooks, only the 
textbook published by Manhattan Press briefly mentions that ‘in May 1989, young 
students and a large mass of people demonstrated at Tianamen Square. In June, the 
government intervened and the incident was resolved’ (Grade 9, p. 163, 2000).   
 On the other hand, references to national feeling are largely absent from actual 
teaching practice.  In the internal examination papers of three schools, there was not 
one question that related to ‘national identification’, and an analysis of the 
examination papers of a further six schools also indicated that this seems to be one 
aim of the intended curriculum that is largely ignored at the classroom level.  Neither 
was national identification included in the 2008 CEE.  Thus, teachers seem to be 
following the well-established ‘pattern’ of teaching dynastic history rather than 
promoting a sense of national identification.  It can be regarded that some teachers 
themselves find it difficult to identify with a communist regime and hence they would 
avoid discussing (and examining) national identification.  
It is clear then that although, since 1997, both the junior level and CEE 
syllabuses have included ‘national identification’ as one of their aims, this aim has 
largely been presented in textbooks rather than in teaching, learning and examination.  
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Regarding the three dominant themes: the study of Chinese History as a continuous 
whole, a Han-centred viewpoint and an orthodox view, the development of Chinese 
History in this period has largely been inherited from the last two periods, except that 
at the CEE level (2003) there were less prescriptive views and teachers and students 
were given room to interpret historical events and personages.  This change can 
largely be attributed to the curriculum reform that took place in 1999 and the 
emphasis on promoting students’ critical thinking skills. 
Conclusion 
Hong Kong’s Chinese History curriculum is characterized by didactic teaching and 
testing of established knowledge (except for the 2006-2008 CEE paper).  Its roles 
have been as a moralising agent and a guardian of the Han-centred orthodox view of 
Chinese history, and these roles can be regarded as a form of ‘social control’, which 
Porter and Stradling (1982) define as being to initiate students into prevailing social 
norms related to work, family and citizenship.  
The academic orientation of Chinese History applies to both its form and its 
content.  In terms of curriculum form, Chinese History has tended to emphasise 
individual rote learning and examination-oriented study.  As for curriculum content, 
the focus has always been very much on content knowledge, characterized by 
orthodoxy, moralising, and a Han-centred interpretation of history, which took shape 
as early as the Confucian period and were later on incorporated into the orthodox 24 
Dynastic Histories.  Since the purpose of The 24 Dynastic Histories was to serve the 
interests of the state, individual events and personages in the imperial court were 
recorded in detail with a view to highlighting good or bad deeds and loyal or disloyal 
behavior.  Moreover, over the last 60 years the time frame and content knowledge of 
Chinese History have been continually expanding.  This can be attributed to the 
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chronological approach adopted by curriculum developers, who have insisted that 
Chinese History is sacred and indivisible and needs to be studied in its entirety before 
one can come to appreciate the essence of Chinese culture.  One result of this is that 
the whole 3000 years of history is repeated three times (Grade 7-9, 10-11 and 12-13) 
in secondary schools in ever-increasing detail.  Another very important feature of 
Chinese History has been its focus on imperial court history, supplemented by cultural 
history.  The rise and fall of dynasties are interpreted as being attributable mainly to 
the deeds of emperors and their court officials, while the social structure or 
relationships between the economic and political infrastructures at particular points in 
time are not referred to, nor used as analytical frameworks. As a result of the 
academic orientation of Chinese History, students are presented with a body of facts 
without any means of achieving genuine understanding and with little chance for 
critical analysis.   
In this way, the curriculum content of Chinese History has been characterized 
throughout the past sixty years by its focus on a relatively static body of facts, and on 
orthodox views that aim at providing moral instruction to students and promoting a 
Han-centred view of history.  It is this curriculum, characterized by depoliticization 
and decontextualization, that has corresponded to the socio-political needs of Hong 
Kong, both during colonization and after the handover of sovereignty.  During the 
colonial rule, the Chinese History curriculum encouraged political apathy on the part 
of students, which meant that it would not pose a threat to the colonial government.  
Since the handover, on the other hand, Chinese History has been seen as a means of 
instilling in students a sense of national identity, although in reality, this aim has not 
been realised in terms of teaching and learning, and examination.   
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